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Abstract
Is there some relation between the degradation and 
grazing institution? This paper attempts to find internal 
mechanism among the institution, herdsman behavior 
and degradation. The behavior of herdsman once was 
analyzed in private property of grassland, although once 
opposed. A grazing contract model under uncertainty 
was built, with which the herding behavior was checked. 
To analyze the relationship and mechanism between 
contracts characteristics and grassland degradation, the 
relation between and different risk preferences were 
studied under the decentralized equilibrium of the contract 
through setting the different parameters to show the 
basic characteristics of the grazing contract. We reach the 
following conclusions: the risk preferences of the type of 
pastoral are important to grassland degradation. The fact 
means the party to a contract is risk-neutral and will lead 
to overgrazation. Grassland degradation will arise in some 
situation expected utility maximization, even when both 
parties are risk averse. The conclusion is similar Elinor 
Ostrom’s points in 1990 that private property rights of 
grasslands may not the only, even not the best solution.
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INTRODUCTION
China’s economic institution reform extended to 
grassland animal husbandry since 1985. The grassland 
reform resulted in two opposite effects: on one hand the 
animal product (production value and number) increased 
year by year, which is illustrated at Figure 1 and Figure 
2; on the other hand grassland ecology deteriorated. 
According to 2005 Environment Condition Bulletin of 
China issued by the State Environmental Protection 
Administration, 90% natural grassland of china was of 
degradation in certain degrees. Grassland degradation 
will not only increase the cost of grass production, 
but also lead to a series of environmental problems as 
desertification, biodiversity loss, soil degradation, soil 
erosion and the loss of carbon sinks.
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Figure 1
The Ratio of Animal Husbandry Output Value
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Figure 2
The Increasing of Animal Stock 
In china, more and more scholars and officials have 
recognized the importance of institution arrangement 
to grassland use, however china’s earlier grassland 
management has its focus and feature. Here we simply 
introduce China’s grassland property right system 
household responsibility system (HRS) which means 
the 30 yearlong or longer exclusive use right of a piece 
of grassland is endowed to a herdsman and during the 
periods herdsmen can use it by himself or gain benefit 
from transferring the land to the others. More often once 
a herdsman obtains the land he will fence the grassland 
and if he wants to feed more animals, he can rent another 
piece of grassland for a short or long time but the rent 
periods must be below using time limit of herdsmen’s 
endowed land. According to Eirik G. Furubotn and 
Svetozar Pejovich (1972) and Cheung (1968 & 1970), 
exclusive right to use and transferable rights for resource 
constitutes main characteristic of private property rights 
(PPR), and then china’s HRS can be classified to a certain 
PPR.1 While one may argue that the rights of HRS of 
china has terminable limitation, for our present purpose it 
suffices to point out that according to the HRS’s rule the 
herdsman always can obtain another 30 yearlong or longer 
terminable property rights of his grassland when the land’s 
30 years use periods have ended, so although there is 
some inconvenient especially when to data of termination, 
the herdsmen use their grassland freely in their daily life 
as if it belongs to them.  
Few theories have been developed to explain the 
relation and mechanism between grassland degradation 
and grazing institution change of China. The earlier 
theory on commons and common pool resource developed 
by Gordon (1954), Hardin (1968) and Oplhuls (1973) 
1 Any property rights have their limitation, so do private property 
rights (PPR), according to china’s HRS, the endowed grassland of 
herdsmen has included the rights to exclusive use, to gain, and to 
transfer in a fixed periods; so from a view of broad meanings of 
PPR, we can say in China herdsmen’s grassland is PPR.
showed that pubic or open access resource might be 
destroyed by human being’s over abuse. In case of 
grasslands inevitable ecologic degradation, and this line’s 
scholars also implied that commons tragedy problems was 
either due to uncontrolled access or resource inalienable, 
so common resource need either privatization or put 
under surveillance. Since the mid-1980s, discussions 
over what kind of institution arrangements accounts for 
sustainable resource use have undergone remarkable 
change in the worldwide, most notably are the research 
progress in common property arrangement and common-
pool resources, in which most of commons studies believe 
neither PPR nor state intervention could work and some 
control must be devolved to local user over resource. Arun 
Agrawal (2001) gave comparisons of existing studies 
and provided measures of those dependent variables used 
on the commons. For china’s grassland conservation, 
however, discussions about PPR of grassland are 
necessary, china’s meadow management based on HRS 
which in fact PPR may provide a profound view and 
experience for resource governing. 
Different with other commons such as sea fish and 
forest, grassland more like market goods, which is 
separable individually in area and is controllable for 
access, so in theory it more fits for PPR, and according 
to rational man hypothesis, herdsmen acquire not only 
short-term product revenue but long-term property rights 
revenue, therefor they will adopt some conservative 
measure for future property revenue, and then meadow 
not only provides animal product and well ecologic 
environment, but that does not accord with reality. The 
fact that grasslands serious degradation following china’s 
institution reform cannot been well explained for grazing 
HRS in fact endows the pasture’s PPR to the herdsmen. 
The intuition behind our result is simple. Under 
the conventional economics competitive paradigm, in 
which resource is significant only to production but few 
consideration applied to the effect to ecology. A herdsman 
whatever who is short-sighted or far-sighted more pay 
attention to the asset revenue and value other than the role 
of resource in consideration to society such as ecology or 
culture meanings. In some constraints the herdsman will 
adopt some fast discount.
This paper seeks to find an explanation of grassland 
degradation under PPR. Neoclassical economics 
assumption will be maintained and a production function 
including two factors is introduced, and share-cropping 
theory is applied to analyze a contract between herdsmen 
and herd owner. Through our analysis, we found the 
risk preference of contract parties is crucial to grassland 
degradation It was traditionally believed that animal 
husbandry and farming have the same feature after 
produced by their land and labor. In fact, too much labor 
is not dispensable for grazing practice compared with 
farming. The output is easier to monitor through the weight 
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and survival rate of animals. Less labor means grazing is 
more economical efficiency of scale than farming. Here 
scale effect means increased animal production without 
cost of labor and supervision addtion. It will focus on how 
grazing HRS will impact grassland utilization with new 
institutional economics in grazing research.
In order to explore the relation and mechanism 
between china grazing HRS and grasslands degradation, 
its history was reviewed in the first part of the paper. The 
production function and the institution characteristics 
of grazing were describe in the second part. In the third 
part, after introduced expected utility function, solved the 
grazing production dispersion equilibrium, it was analyzed 
the nature of institution and the relationship between 
overgrazing and grassland degradation. The fourth part is 
a summary of the full text.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1  Transaction Costs and Sharing Contracts in 
Agriculture
A traditional belief of economists is that the fixed rent 
is better than sharing rent. This argument can date back 
to Adam Smith (Yang, 2001). These early views on land 
tenure are mainly from the British economist, Marshall. 
The views Hayami and Otsuka (1993, p.29) have made 
a detailed exposition. In fact, transaction costs will not 
be considered in agriculture production by traditional 
economics. “best” institution was always taken as 
effective prescription, but real world has inevitable 
positive transaction costs, then kinds of institutions do 
works, and the sharing contracts and fixed rent in different 
circumstance may be Pareto efficient, although the 
condition of marginal equal is not established.
Cheung (1968) first questioned that the contract of 
tenant share is inefficient. Cheung’s analysis shows that 
the traditional economics assumed that production risk 
is certain, whereas in fact uncertainty was existed in 
the production of agriculture. Assumed tenant farmer 
is risk aversion, a sharing contract will be provided 
by the landlord. Cheung also found that tenant’s labor 
must be monitored to gain more production in this case. 
Stiglitz (1974) first grasped the perspective that one 
trade-off dilemma was confronted with the sharing rent 
between risk-sharing and work incentives. In his analysis 
framework, the lower share ratio indicates, smaller risks 
the tenant have to bear. The higher share ratio will give 
tenants an incentive to work hard. The consideration to the 
risk-sharing and incentive will make tenant obtain more 
production but not simply considered only one risk factor. 
One flaw in Stiglitz’s theoretical framework is that the 
sharing system has no advantage to the fixed one when 
parties of the contracts are risk neutral.
The General assumption of the literature is whether 
the landlord will use the same ratio of the output to share 
a part of the cost. According to Braverman and Stiglitz’s 
(1982) studies, the proportional rules will no longer valid 
once the asymmetric and uncertainty of the information 
is introduced. Bardhan (1983) developed this study. 
Newberry (1977) investigate the advantages of sharing 
institution from the perspective of the market risk.
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) investigated the sharing 
contract from the perspective of double incentives. If the 
tenant can get all the residual outputs of the land, nothing 
will obtain by the landlord. The tenant gets the maximum 
incentive and the landlord get nothing incentive. On 
the contrary, if the landlord obtains all the marginal 
production of land, tenant won’t get any marginal output. 
At this time, the landlord maximums his incentive and the 
tenant get nothing incentive.
After reviewed above, it was found that the analysis 
of sharing contract most focused on the farming industry, 
whereas rarely on the grassland grazing production. the 
reason for that the grassland grazing has more complexity 
involves not only land and labor but also animal stocks, 
the economic interests of the herders and the ecology of 
the grassland. That is to say, grassland grazing has the 
property of ecological public goods.
1.2  New Institution Economic Analysis of 
Grassland Animal Husbandry
Contrasted with the significant academic achievements in 
farming studies, new classical economics was encountered 
with great puzzle in analysis of grassland grazing 
production. Producers wanting the maximize economic 
benefits often overlooks the limitations of exhaustible 
natural grassland productivity. Bounding to face the 
threat of grassland degradation, excessive will damage 
producers’ long-term interests and do harm to the interests 
of neighbor and spectator in the end. Starting with S. 
Gordon (1954) and G. Hardin (1968), new institutional 
economics become mainstreams in the analysis of grazing 
grassland production.
Summed up Scott Gordon’s view, Feeny, et al., (1990) 
believed that every fisherman in the public pool consider 
their own marginal costs and benefits, and ignore harm 
of their behavior to the return of other fishermen and the 
future stability of the stock pond. In this way, the public 
will run out of pond productivity soon, whereas damage 
to all participants.
Hardin (1968) argued that no restrictions access to 
the common for the residents will leads to the grassland 
degradation. The residents, who make the decision to 
increase the number of livestock, are rational to pursue 
their maximization income. But when all the people do 
same, grassland inevitably degraded.
Hardin (1978) believed that there were two ways to 
solve the problem of the commons: “private enterprise 
system” and “socialism”.
Eleanor Ostrom (2008) had a review to problems 
and practices of the common pool resources. Eleanor 
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Ostrom (2008) did not agree that the central government 
or private property is “the only way” to solve tragedy 
of the commons. What is more, Eleanor Ostrom (2008) 
argued that neither government control nor private 
ownership by real world cases is spontaneous solution. 
Ostrom’s point of view has had a profound impact to 
the research perspectives and analysis of public (shared) 
resources.
Generally speaking, scholars seem like or at least don’t 
refuse such ideas that private property right can solve 
the ecology problem. However, they just didn’t give any 
demonstration in details.
1.3  Theory of Sharing Contracts and Grassland 
Grazing Production
The point of this paper is inspired by Barzel’s (2005) 
contribution on measurement costs in agriculture. 
Barzel’s (2005) pointed that for some attributions haven’t 
been made a price due to high measurement costs in 
farming. The use sizes attributed haven’t reached best 
sizes in the marginal condition will lead to moral risk 
behaviors of parties of the contract. The input includes 
grassland, animal stock, labor and forage and such input 
as labor and forage is easy to check in grassland grazing. 
it was assumed that fixed gains can be earned by labor 
and forage, which can be bought or employ by market. 
Here we focus on grassland and animal stock. Grassland 
productivity is uncertainty influenced by such factor as 
season, precipitation and soil fertility. Likewise, animal 
stock production is uncertainty influenced by such factor 
as falling ill and weak. It was thought there are some 
transaction costs when the two factors into production or 
some contracts. According to Barzel’s analysis (2005), 
the more difficult to measure factor attribute, the more 
important to affect team production, the more attributes 
to share residue. In case of grazing, both the grassland 
and livestock are important to the final production, 
and their contribution to the production is difficult to 
measure. in case of grazing, the respective owners of 
grassland and livestock will enter into a contract or 
organization to ensure benefit of both sides. One of the 
benefits to owner of grassland is to guarantee optimal 
use of the grassland not to degradation. If Barzel’s 
conclusion is true, how to explain the degradation of 
china’s grassland took place just in time, as the two 
factors have freedom to contracts?
It was argued that the sharing contract theory is still 
the appropriate framework to the economic analysis of 
grassland grazing. Based on reasonable assumptions, the 
conclusions of the framework is important to the contract 
theory as well as to the ecological economic theory.
2.  METHOD
Based above analysis, it was assumed that there are two 
actors in grassland grazing, rancher and the herdsman. 
The rancher owns meadows and herdsman owns livestock 
at the same time. They must cooperate in order to produce 
animals. For simplicity, in the basic model without 
considering such factors as policy control, forage input 
and labor input.
2.1  Model Explanations
Suppose T is the grassland input rancher owns, K is 
livestock input the herdsman owns. For any pasture, the 
output Q is the constant returns to scale function of land T 
and livestock K.
  ( ( ) , )Q F h T Kθ=  (1)
θ stands for the uncertainty of grassland production 
induced by season, precipitation and soil fertility, h(θ) 
stands for the output loss due to uncertainty in any 
quantity inputs of T and K.
As F is a homogeneous function, the following 
equation will be established:
/ ( ) ( / ,1) ( ) ( )Q T h F K T h f kθ θ= ≡  (2)
In this equation, k=K/T and Eg(θ)≡1,σg
2≡E(g-1)2>0, 
assume further that
  ' 0, '' 0f f> <  (3)
2.2  Model Parameters and the Characteristics of 
the Contract
Assume that Yt is the rancher’s income, Yk is the 
herdsman’s income, there
  /tY Q Tα β= +  (4a)
  (1 )kY Q Tα β= − −  (4b)
Among, 0 ≤ α ≤1
2.2.1  Purely Grazing Sharing Contracts
β=0, and 1>α>0. Herdsman and rancher share the benefits 
according to the sharing ratio agreement.
2.2.2  Grassland Rental Contract
α=0, and β<0. The herdsman leases grassland and 
bears all the risks and benefits of production, and β is 
promissory rent paid by herdsman.
2.2.3  Animal Rental Contract (Agistment Contract)
α=1, and β<0, the rancher leases herdsman’s animals and 
obtains all the residual and the herdsman will obtain a 
promissory money (β).
2.2.4  A Mix of Sharing and Rental Contracts
≠ ≠( ) }{0, 0,1 0,1andβ α  , different from the purely 
grazing sharing contract, the mix of sharing and rental 
contract. There is a fixed amount of compensation for 
grassland or interest of livestock be paid by the user of 
factor.
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To analyze complexity of grazing production, it was 
ignored the production carried out by a single proprietor 
who owns both grassland and livestock, for which goes 
against division of labor. The reality contracts of the 
grazing economic probable one of the five types as 
mentioned above. The question is that which of contracts 
will be adopted under competitive equilibrium of 
grassland grazing, which can be simplified to decision 
problem of α,β.
3.  SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM AND 
ITS CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF THE 
PASTURE PRODUCTION
This section focuses on the optimal decision problem 
of both parties under uncertainty.
3.1  The Risk-Averse Rancher’ Choice of Utility 
Maximization
Ut and Uk are rancher’s and herdsman’s utility function. 
It was assumed both of them are risk aversion, that is 
U"t,U"k<0, constant prairie supply of the rancher.
Averaging the rancher’ income, there is
  ( ) ( ) ( )tY h f kθ α θ β= +  (5)
  So, ( )x f kα≡  (6)
Then, the revenue stream characteristics of the rancher 
can be expressed by x,β. At β given level, the rancher 
prefers a larger x, set the level of x, then prefers the larger 
β. In the optional contracts, β is a function of x for any 
given x.
  ( )xβ β=  (7)
The rancher’ utility maximization can be expressed 
by, max EUt[Yt(θ)]=EUt[xh(θ)+β(x)], if β is differentiable, 
there is
  
'
' '
t
t
EU h
EU
β= −  (8)
That,
  [ ( )] ( , )t t tEU Y V xθ β=  (9)
Given the rancher’ characteristics of risk aversion, 
Ut is a concave function on Y, and V(x,β) is a concave 
function. The rancher will choose the largest β  contract at 
any x level.
3.2  Basic Model’S Characteristic of Contract
Completely symmetrical analysis is suitable for 
herdsman, assume that Vk is the convex function of x,β, 
herdsman’s Utility is decreasing with x,β, only the contract 
that β is the minimize at any x level can be signed. Then 
the rancher will sign the contract that β is maximal at any 
x level, so actually, the contract will fall on the straight 
line which is defined by the equation β(x)≡βˆ(x). Whether 
the β(x) is convex or concave function (see Figure 3), the 
final contract will only be A (or A’ ) and B (B’or B”).
Figure 3
The Contract Trait of Risk-Aversion Rancher and 
Herdsman Under Competitive Equilibrium
In reality, the set of contracts observed will fall on the 
curve which is defined by the equation β=β(x). If both 
parties can be free to choose the contract and cooperator, 
the set of contracts observed must fall on a straight line, 
that is
  β=-ax+b (10)
From (1.10) the rancher’ mean and variance can be 
deduced, 
  Y
_
t ≡ x+β, σt =xσg  (11)
and further we get 
  Y
_
t = pσt +b (12)
Set p=(1-a)/σg, P is similar to price risk.
3.3  Alternative of the Meadows of the Rancher
Assume that the rancher have another choice to produce 
a given level of expected benefits Vˆ , to make the rancher 
supply the grasslands, we must make theV(x,β)≥Vˆ . 
Assume that Rt means the minimum level of utility, then 
the rancher’ expected utility function can be restated as 
following:
  EU≡Rt=EU[xh+β] (13)
For a given value of Rt, we can get β which is a 
function of x from formula (1.13), that is
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  β=g(x,Rt) (14)
and
  '
EUt
'h 1
t
g
x EU
∂
− = ≤
∂
,as Ut
"≤0 (15a)
and
  '
1 0
t t
h
R EU
∂
= >
∂  (15b)
Function g is the utility indifference curve of the 
rancher on (x,β), so g is a concave function.
3.4  The Choice of the Risk-Aversion Herdsman
The herdsman’s income can be expressed as Yk(θ), that is
 ( ) [(1 ) ( ) ( ) ]kY h f k Tθ α θ β= − −  (16a)
When T is the total amount of grasslands owned by 
the rancher, the herdsman’s income is expressed as the 
herdsman’s revenue from each unit of grassland. The 
revenue of the herdsman can be rewritten as:
 ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]kY f k h h xθ θ θ β= − −   (16b)
Let βˆ (x) is the minimum value of x corresponding to β. 
So the maximum expected utility of the herdsman is:
ˆmax [ ( )] [ ( ) ]k k kEU Y EU f k h hxθ β= − −  (17a)
Herdsman must satisfy the condition that the minimum 
utility of the rancher in competition, V(α,β) ≥Vˆ, Rt is given 
here.
  ˆ( , )V Vα β =  (17b)
Get the first-order conditions,
  ' ( ) 0k k
EU gEU h
x x
∂ ∂
= − + =
∂ ∂
 (18a)
and
  ' '(1 ) 0k k
EU EU a f h
k
∂  = − = ∂
 (18b)
With the (1.15a), the above equation can be rewritten 
as,
  1a =  or ' 0f =  (19a)
and
  
' '
' '
k t
K t
EU h EU h
EU EU
=  (19b)
(1.19a) a=1 signify rancher lease contract; f '=0 is, 
when the herdsman choose any other contracts, the 
herdsman will strive to expand the herd of livestock for 
achieving the maximum revenue of productivity, and 
surprisingly, the traits of decision-making is the same as 
the option that is no output risk.
Consider each option of the herdsman’ expected utility 
maximization:
3.4.1  When a=1 and f '≠0, Herdsman Can Choose the 
Agistment Contract to Obtain the Fixed Revenue.
The benefits of cooperation depends only on the utility 
maximization of the rancher, take a = 1 into the rancher’s 
expected utility function, and get the first derivative of k, 
we can get that EUt f 'h=0, this condition describes that the 
choice of agistment contracts don’t change the rancher’s 
decision on the stock of livestock.
3.4.2  When f '=0 and α≠1, the Herdsman Can Choose 
Other Sharing Contracts
Surprisingly, the herdsman will choose the largest stock of 
livestock as if it ignores the capital losses and output caused 
by the uncertainty which exists in animal husbandry. The 
conditions are diametrically opposed to 3.2.1, which may 
mean that in the conditions of the rancher’s pasturing, it 
will choose the agistment contract. While in the case of the 
herdsman’s grazing, it will choose to maintain the largest 
stock of livestock in order to make full use of the grassland, 
as it don’t consider the sharing ratio.
This condition implies the possibility of overgrazing 
and grassland degradation.
3.4.3  The Mean and Variance of First-Order 
Conditions
The mean and standard deviation of the herdsman’ income 
is given as follows:
[ ](1 )kY a f g= − − , (1 )k ha fσ σ≡ −  (20)
According to (1.15 a)
'(1 ) 0kY f g
α
∂
= − + ≤
∂
, ' '1 (1 )kY f a gk
∂  = − + ∂
 (21a)
0k gf
σ
σ
α
∂
= − <
∂
, '(1 ) 0k ga fk
σ
σ
∂
= − >
∂
 (21b)
3.5  The Extended Analysis of Decentralized 
Equilibrium Theory
3.5.1  If the Rancher Is Risk-Neutral, There Is 1+g'=0. 
Adding the Value of α Will Make the Mean Unchanged 
and the Variance Decrease. 
Let α=1, selecting k to make the value of Y
_
k maximize 
(σh=0 at this time), i.e. f '=0. Assumed the area of 
grassland a fixed value, herdsman will increase ewes until 
the maximum output.
3.5.2  If the Herdsman Is Risk-Neutral, It Will Choose α 
to Maximize Y
_
k; If α=0 at This Time, Then Selecting k 
Make f '=0 .
3.5.3  More General, If Both of the Herdsman and the 
Rancher Are Risk Aversion, They Will Stop Investment 
in the Livestock Before Reaching Maximum Expect 
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Production, Because the Standard Deviation Is Also 
Rising Along With the Expected Output to Increase.
Figure 4
Given α, Risk Averse Herdsman K Choice
3.5.4  Given the Value of k, the Mean and Variance of the 
Total Output, the Sum of Income Standard Deviation of 
the Herdsman and the Rancher Equal to the Total Standard 
Deviation 
The expected income of the herdsman and the rancher is 
equal to the total expected income. It can be represented 
all the collocation set with the box (Figure 4). The 
question to be solved is how to configure the mean 
and the variance on the herdsman and the rancher. For 
the herdsman, the utility level of the rancher is given, 
the possibility they can pay rent to the rancher as 
denote r=h(0,rt) will be faced, and take all the risks by 
themselves. Improving the sharing ratio will increase the 
expectation rent to the rancher, and reduce the standard 
deviation of indifference curve.
The herdsman will select one point where the 
indifference curve of the herdsman is tangent to the 
rancher’s. If the point of tangency falls on the diagonal 
line (Figure 5) and point B, which means a pure sharing 
contract, and the mean and the variance will be prorated 
between the herdsman and the rancher. If the point is a 
corner solution falling on horizontal axis, then the rental 
contract will be chosen such as point D, or something of 
the agistment contract be chosen such as point C. If the 
point falls on the any value of the variance, it means that 
one is more risk-aversion than the other. One side of risk-
neutral will bear all the risks.
Figure 5
Allocation of the Mean-Ariance of Herdsman and 
Rancher
CONCLUSION
Compared with the existing literatures on sharing 
contract, such as Joseph and E Stiglitz (1974) indicated 
that sharing institution played a key role in incentive and 
risks distributional, the main contribution of this paper is 
to introduce the sharing contract theory and uncertainty 
to the economic analysis of grassland grazing, and to 
discuss basic attribute of major grazing contracts and 
basic relationship between grassland degradation and 
contract attribute, respectively. Although new institution 
economic theories give promising in study of grassland 
grazing economy, it is short of general analysis frame and 
limits application of the theory for the study of grassland 
grazing.
It is to propose a facilitated analysis framework for 
discussing the application of sharing contract theories 
in grazing. the internal mechanism of grassland grazing 
contracts was explored with this framework. the basic 
features of different types of contracts was shown based 
on different parameter (α, β) through studying basic 
feature of homogeneous production function of two 
different input factors under uncertainty conditions. The 
exploration particular focused on the nature of the contract 
under condition that the expected utility is maximize 
and the dispersion equalization under the assumption 
at different risk preferences. Then, the relations and 
mechanisms were inspected between the grazing contract 
and grassland degradation. This analysis framework can 
be further extended to analyze the contract’ feature under 
such following conditions as asymmetric information, 
carrying capacity control of pastures and the sharing of 
labor cost and forage The study of this framework helps 
explain the specific contract of grazing industry and its 
ecological and cultural meanings.
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The main entries of conclusions as following:
Many grazing contracts could be chosen on the 
condition of constant returns to scale and risk-aversion 
utility function;
In the strict risk aversion utility function and a 
decentralized equilibrium expected utility maximization 
of parties to the contract. There have two possible optimal 
choices: one of which is agistment contract by the 
rancher. It means that the owner of the larger grassland is 
responsible for grazing after a revenue share decided.
Driven by the expected utility maximization, either 
party are of risk aversion. Choice of either party will 
induce the risk of overstocks. That means greater profits 
will be made by bigger livestock herds.
It is proved that if both parties have characteristics of 
risk neutral, they will increase the stock of animals (dams) 
till the maximum output. The maximum output implies 
the risk of overgrazing, and the risk of overgrazing is an 
important factor of grassland degradation. Risk preference 
type of the one responsible for grazing will radically 
determine whether grassland overgrazed or not. It was 
proved that provided any party to the contract prefers 
the risk neutral type and to choose overgrazing. This 
conclusion is helpful for further study of the grazing 
culture in the role of preventing grassland degradation.
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